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Understanding creation through the theological loci of Christology 
and Trinitarian theology gives a view of the natural world as both 
contingent and free. This distinctively Christian view of the natural 
world carries implications for the natural sciences in terms of 
philosophical modality. This paper explores three such themes: (i) 
the nature of reason; (ii) the character of theories; and (iii) the 
relationship between discursivity and the logic of reality. 
 
A trinitarian and Christocentric account of creation undergirds both the 
absolute freedom of God and the contingent freedom of creation. 
Understanding the natural world in relation to God’s triunity and the 
person of Jesus Christ provides us with the fundamental grammar by 
which we can speak of the world around us as in possession of its own 
distinct reality and intelligible order. Crucially, the natural world’s distinct 
reality and intelligibility are not derived from within itself in the fashion 
of some internal determinism. Instead, both are given to creation from 
beyond itself by God in the act of freely creating something other than 
himself. The natural world is free and it is contingent (both at the level of 
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its existence and its being the way it is). For this reason, a distinctively 
Christian theological account of the natural world carries implications for 
the natural sciences in terms of the philosophical modality employed in 
scientific discovery. This paper elucidates three main areas in which this 
is so: (i) the nature of reason; (ii) the character of theories; and (iii) the 
relation of discursive reason to the ontic order of reality through the 
disturbance of sensibility.  
Within the science and religion dialogue, this is not an attempt to give 
an account of theology that may or may not be acceptable to the natural 
scientist. Nor is this an exercise in listening to the natural scientist, her 
theories and methods, understanding the implications these have for 
theology and attending to the questions they raise. These are worthwhile 
endeavours but are not what this paper is concerned with. Instead, this 
paper argues that a theological understanding of the natural universe can 
be translated through the mediating agent of philosophy such that it makes 
constructive comments to the philosophy of science concerning 
contingence. Certainly, if the realist presupposition is allowed that 
scientific thought is concerned with existent things independent from the 
human knower and that ‘to know’ something is for our thought to be 
determined by that existing thing, then it is of significance to the scientist 
that creation is contingent.  
There have been a wide range of ways in which Christian theologians 
have set about describing a positive account of the relationship of theology 
and the natural sciences at the level of modality. For Isaac Newton, 
absolute space and time, which gave intelligible uniformity to the 
phenomena at the level of relative space and time by which it might be 
schematized and understood, was equated to the divine sensorium. As Karl 
Popper has demonstrated, such an account of coherence at the level of 
relativity was translated to the knowing mind by the application of the 
transcendental cognitive power of the human knower upon sensibility by 
Immanuel Kant.1 Stanley Jaki held that God has given to creation its own 
distinct and contingent order by merit of its creation through the Logos 
whereby it is capable of being examined and understood.2 For Fr Georges 
Florovsky, the contingence of creation is of vital importance because it 
reminds us that creation is not characterized by necessity and so theoretical 
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systems that exclusively focus on coherence, such logical deduction from 
a priori axioms is, at best, an inappropriate way to gain knowledge of a 
contingent universe.3 The engagement with the natural sciences, their 
findings, formation of theories and impact on the way we understand 
reality was a major concern of Wolfhart Pannenberg. The scope of his 
theology, with its programmatic theme of revelation as history, means that 
for Pannenberg the modern chasm between the knowledge of nature and 
theology must be challenged. As such, the development of a system of 
theology was accompanied by a parallel engagement with the natural 
sciences both from their philosophical implications and the questions they 
raise for the theologian.4 For T. F. Torrance, theology has much to learn 
from the natural sciences about a proper way to coordinate thought with 
being whereby the theoretical structure by which we cognize something is 
shaped by the internal coherence of the reality itself.5 Likewise, the 
scientist can learn a spiritual dimension to their task as they operate as the 
‘priest of creation’, giving articulation to the coherent order that God has 
given creation.6 
The approach taken here inherits much of this recent tradition and 
looks to integrate it more fully with the programmatic centrality of the core 
loci of Christian theology: the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology. If 
the argument of this paper tacks more toward one priority than another, it 
is toward the perspective of Georges Florovsky that I think the weight of 
a theological account of the natural world shapes our modality of knowing 
creation as the natural world. However, the approach taken here is also 
heavily influenced by T. F. Torrance in his conviction that what we think 
about creation must take its shape from its relation to God, and that God's 
transitive relation to creation is understood in coordination with non-
transitive relations of the immanent Trinity.7 
 
The triune Creator 
 
The doctrine of the Trinity is the irreducible foundation of an 
understanding of creation as both free (i.e. distinct from God) and 
contingent (i.e. having no internal reason for its being or for its being the 
way that it is).8 The importance of the doctrine of the Trinity in any account 
 
Theology in Scotland 
 
 
Creation and the philosophy of science 
 
46 
of the relationship of God and creation is well demonstrated by Thomas 
Aquinas’ doctrine of mixed relations. Aquinas’ mixed relations arises out 
from an account of divine perfection and the relation of God to creation 
conceived of a priori in the tight conceptual package of aseity, simplicity 
and immutability. It is an account of the non-reciprocal relations of God 
and creation (with creation’s relation to God being necessary and God’s 
relation to creation being volitional) which undermines the reality of God’s 
relation to creation. The doctrine of ‘mixed relations’, in effect, acts as a 
prophylactic against any suggestion that God, in creating, became that 
which he was not. It is an attempt to address the concern that, if some 
accidental property did come to be predicated of God, it would undermine 
immutability and mereological simplicity. God’s relation to creation is 
thus categorized as a ‘logical’ as opposed to ‘real’ relation. So, by 
categorizing God’s relation to creation as a logical relation it does not 
denote anything real in God. Creation’s contingence and divine freedom 
are preserved at the expense of the reality of the relation of God and 
creation.  
Aquinas’ doctrine of mixed relations is trying to carry some very 
important cargo: God’s existence and full realisation does not depend on 
his relation to anything other than himself. God’s outward relations to 
creation do not constitute God. Now, it is imperative we carry this cargo, 
even if the doctrine of mixed relations is a problematic way to do so. We 
cannot surrender the absolute priority of God in his eternal reality aside 
from his relations to creation without collapsing God into his relations to 
creation and demolish both the freedom of God and the freedom of his 
creation. However, at the same time, we should not affirm God’s aseity in 
a way that makes it impossible to conceive of God’s direct action in 
creation.  
If we reconceive of the freedom of God in trinitarian terms, the 
absolute freedom of God is preserved alongside the reality of God’s 
relation to creation. Should aseity be thought of in terms of God’s non-
transitive triunity we would arrive at a modified account of simplicity and 
immutability which affirms rather than undermines God’s real relation to 
creation. In short, an account of divine perfection which preserves both the 
freedom of God from creation and the freedom of God to be for creation. 
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It is just such a manoeuvre, I suggest, that undergirds an account of 
creation which is in possession of its own freedom which is given to it by 
the reality of God’s relation to it.  
God’s aseity is God’s freedom. As self-existent, God is grounded in 
his own being and does not need any other for total self-realisation. God 
exists out of himself. God’s freedom, as Karl Barth said, is grounded in 
God’s own being, determined and moved by himself.9 A consequence, but 
not component, of God’s freedom is that God is not conditioned by 
external factors, such as creation. God’s freedom is not like the negative 
liberty of Isaiah Berlin: God’s freedom is not constituted by liberty from 
external interference. If it were, then freely entering into covenantal 
relation with creation would undermine his freedom. As it is, the self-
grounded freedom of God means that God can enter covenantal obligations 
to creation without surrendering his own freedom. The significance of the 
transcendence of God as the prerequisite of divine communion with 
creation is admirably demonstrated in John Calvin by Julie Canlis. 
 
Calvin fights for God’s transcendence not due to some abstract 
Nominalist principle but for the purpose of communion. God’s 
transcendence is not God’s imprisonment over (and thus out of) the 
world, but rather his freedom to be present to the world. While 
God’s transcendence is often hailed as the most distinctive mark of 
Reformed theology, this transcendence – if it is to follow Calvin – 
must not mean external relationship to the world but the absolute 
freedom with which God stands in relationship to his creatures. It 
establishes the radical noncontinuity of grace and the world. It 
certainly does not establish that grace and the world have nothing 
to do with each other!10 
 
If, then, we understand God’s aseity in terms of his non-transitive 
relations, then God’s self-grounded existence is conceived of as the 
fullness of God’s triune life. The persons may not be reduced to some 
anterior unity and nor may the essence be traced back to an anterior 
plurality or anterior monarchy. The triune God is one divine essence which 
has its existence in threefold personal modification, differentiated through 
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respective modes of origin. In his non-transitive relations, the being of God 
is the one who loves in the perfect, sufficient and self-contained reciprocity 
of Father, Son and Spirit. God’s aseity, therefore, is his triune love.  
One effect of forming an equivalence between aseity and God’s non-
transitive relations is that God’s transitive relations are not accidental but 
is proper to the being of God. As proper to the being of God and not 
accidental, God’s transitive relations do not undermine simplicity. The 
simplicity of the triune God is one essence in threefold personal 
modification existing in a communion of love. His outward turn to us in 
his transitive relations is an expression of the fact that God does not exist 
in solitude but in fellowship. The being-of-God-who-loves extends beyond 
the limitless abundance of his non-transitive love in a generous, volitional 
fellowship-seeking act toward creation.11 By this connection, the pattern 
of the triune relations in se is the ground and the grammar of God’s 
relations pro nobis. However, God’s transitive relations do not have a 
retroactive effect upon the non-transitive. With Rahner, we affirm that the 
immanent Trinity is the economic, but we do not allow the reverse 
movement. God enters the limitations of covenantal obligations all the 
while remaining unchanged in the freedom of his non-transitive relations. 
To identify divine freedom in terms of Trinitarian theology allows us 
to affirm some core dogmas of classical theology and so not divest 
ourselves of the crucial content that resides within them even if they have 
become dressed in the garb of discursive, axiomatic or scholastic theology. 
This is not without its problems. How might the reconceptualising of 
simplicity avoid the accusation of modal collapse if God’s transitive 
relations are in kinship with his non-transitive relations? Moreover, if 
God’s transitive relations are determined by the non-transitive but the 
covenantal commitments do not rebound back into the non-transitive, then 
is there not a risk of inserting a dualism between the immanent and the 
economic Trinity, leaving us with a God behind the back of Jesus Christ? 
These are significant problems which will require working through 
elsewhere. 
However, our concern, here, though is not with the doctrine of God per 
se but with how a doctrine of God provides us with the fundamental 
grammar for a doctrine of creation. By taking our leave from the doctrine 
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of the Trinity, we are able to affirm both God’s freedom from creation and 
God’s freedom to be for creation. God exists as Father, Son and Spirit quite 
independent of his relations to us. There is no divine need which creation 
addresses.12 The coming into being of creation is not theogony by the back 
door. In this sense, the absolute freedom of God allows us to make a crucial 
separation of creation and necessity: God is not bound to creation as a First 
Cause within a chain of causation. However, this does not mean that 
creation is the result of chance, for the opposite of necessity is not chance 
but grace: ‘God’s triune self-sufficiency means that his relation to created 
being is gratuitous’.13 In this connection, Christoph Schwöbel’s explor-
ation of creation as a speech act of the triune God is very helpful in 
emphasising that creation is a deliberative and purposive act of God taken 
in the freedom of his choice.14 In other words, the relation of grace and 
nature is essential to the actual existence of nature. Such an account of the 
relation of grace and nature must be articulated in Christological terms and 
is elaborated on below.  
However, such a construction demands that we affirm the reality of 
God’s relation to creation. If creation is dependent on the relation of God 
to it, then a merely logical relation of God and creation is equivalent to a 
merely logical existence of creation. If, however, God’s freedom from 
creation is conceived of on Trinitarian terms (and not by a package of 
certain metaphysical presuppositions, such as immutability or simplicity), 
then God is not locked into his own freedom in such a way that precludes 
the reality of his outward relations to creation. Instead, the triune God is 
free to be for creation. Therefore, while creation is not necessary to God it 
is in a real relationship to God. This real relationship between God and 
creation is characterized by the volition of God. Creation is not necessary 
to God; it is chosen by God. From this bedrock, we can speak of creation 
as possessing a contingent freedom. It is brought into existence by the act 
of God to have a reality quite aside from God’s own reality.  
Following Fr Florovsky, we may conceptualize the difference between 
the absolute freedom of God and the contingent freedom of creation 
through the immeasurable qualitative difference between the generation of 
the Son from the being of the Father and the making of creation in 
accordance with the will of the Father.15 God’s non-transitive relations are 
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the way in which the one God has his life as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
As such, they are constitutive of what it is to be God. These relations are 
not volitional as if God could have chosen to have his life some other way. 
These relations are not temporal in the sense that there is some notion of 
progress or process within the divine life. On the other hand, God’s 
transitive relations are not the way God has his life in eternity and are not 
constitutive of what God is. These transitive relations are volitional (God 
willed to extend beyond himself and enter relationship with that which is 
not to make it that which is) and they are temporal (creation has its 
existence in being brought into existence from nothing). 
The distinction between the non-transitive and transitive relations of 
God allows us to give a powerful articulation of the non-necessity of 
creation.  
 
The world exists. But it began to exist. And that means: the world 
could have not existed. There is no necessity whatsoever for the 
existence of the world. Creaturely existence is not self-sufficient 
and is not independent. In the created world itself there is no 
foundation, no basis for genesis and being. Creation by its very 
existence witnesses to and proclaims its creaturehood, it proclaims 
it has been produced.16 
 
Creation is thus characterized by a form of indeterminate possibility. There 
is no reason for creation to be or for creation to be the way it is, other than 
the will of God for it to be and to be the way that it is.17 The contingence 
of creation, therefore, means that creation does not contain within itself a 
reason for its existence or for its having existence the way that it does. 
However, it is precisely this characteristic that clearly distinguishes it from 
God as that which is given its own life aside from God. The contingence 
of creation, then, has a complex structure which Torrance has described as 
the ‘interlocking of dependence and independence’.18 Accordingly, the 
intelligible order of the universe is not a closed intelligibility that arises 
out from created reality itself. Instead, it is an intelligible order that is given 
to it by its being made by the will of the Father through the divine Logos 
in the power of the Spirit. However, if we are to understand the curious 
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interlocking structure of dependence and independence, it can only be 
when it is stated with a Christological grammar. 
 
Christ and creation 
 
Andrew Torrance and Thomas McCall’s recent volume, Christ and the 
Created Order, opens with the conviction that the Christian claim that in 
the person of Jesus Christ, God and creation are united but not confused is 
uniquely relevant for what we think about the natural world.19 It is in Jesus 
that God the Creator is revealed within his creation, the character of God’s 
relation to creation and agency within it is made known and it is in Christ 
that the created order is redeemed and lifted again to the purpose of its 
existence. However, the concern of this paper is not to go over the ground 
covered by the excellent chapters regarding the order of creation held 
together by Christ,20 and the existence of creation through Christ.21 This 
paper takes a different but complementary approach to the matter of how 
Christology shapes our understanding of the natural world via an analysis 
of the structure of the hypostatic union as normative over the relation of 
God and creation in general.  
Jesus Christ is the normative example of the relation of God and 
creation. Rowan Williams has recently explored this theme in his superb 
study Christ: The Heart of Creation, in which he argues that Christology 
provides the model by which to comprehend the relationship of grace and 
nature. 
 
God makes the world to be itself, to have an integrity and 
completeness and goodness that is – by God’s gift – its own. At the 
same time, God makes the world to be open to a relation with God’s 
own infinite life that can enlarge and transfigure the created order 
without destroying it. The model developed in Christology is the 
model that clarifies all we say about God’s relation with the world, 
the relation between the infinite and the finite, Creator and creation 
[…]. And all this is summed up in our belief in a Christ who is 
uninterruptedly living a creaturely, finite life on earth and at the 
same time living out depths of divine life and uninterruptedly 
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enjoying the relation that enterally subsists between the divine 
Source or Father and the divine Word or Son.22 
 
Williams’ focus falls on the overlapping agency of God and creation in the 
person of Jesus Christ in which the free agency of God on creation does 
not compromise the free agency of creation and vice versa. The focus here 
does not fall on the question of agency but on the question of structure. 
The following paragraphs explore the normativity of Jesus Christ for the 
God-creation relation from the structural relation of the divine and human 
natures in the person of Jesus Christ. The contention is that the logic of the 
incarnation is normative for the logic of creation.  
The starting point of such a theological mood is the essential 
discontinuity between God and nature which, far from precluding God’s 
action in creation, is the prerequisite of God acting in creation without 
collapsing into it or causing creation to collapse into him. There is no 
inherent analogical proportionality between God and creation. The 
analogical proportion between God and human knowing is established in 
Jesus Christ. This means that the character of the relationship between 
grace and nature is demonstrated in the union of the divine nature and 
human nature in the person of Jesus Christ. The hypostatic union as the 
theological doctrine that articulates the mystery of the incarnation is the 
archetypal structure that all other accounts of the divine-human relation 
must be in proportional relation to. Christian theology must take the formal 
structure of the hypostatic union as its governing structure at all levels 
from philosophical to applied theology. 
The twin concepts of anhypostasia and enhypostasia constitute the 
grammar by which we may talk about the union of divine nature and 
human nature in the person of Jesus Christ without confusion of or change 
to their mutual integrity and without their division or separation within the 
person of Jesus. Anhypostasia means that the human nature of Jesus Christ 
had no subsistence prior to God the Son assuming human nature to 
himself. In so doing, it emphasizes that the human nature of Christ is 
entirely dependent on the divine act of grace in God the Son assuming it 
into union with himself. In this way, anhypostasia insists upon the priority 
of the grace of God and the dependence of the human nature upon the 
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divine will and act for its existence. Enhypostasia means that, having been 
assumed, the human nature of Jesus Christ has a real and true subsistence 
as human as (or ‘in’) the person of the Son. In this way, enhypostasia 
insists upon the integrous existence of human nature as truly human, 
uncompromised by its dependence on the priority of God’s grace. 
Anhypostasia and enhypostasia are in a vital complementarity. 
Anhypostasia is the presupposition of enhypostasia, for it is because the 
human nature of Jesus has no per se subsistence that it must subsist in the 
person of the Son by merit of his assumption by the Son. This 
complementarity means that in the incarnate Christ the priority of the grace 
of God and the integrity of the human nature are preserved. 
The programmatic logic of Christology shapes the logic of our doctrine 
of creation, specifically its contingent freedom. The syntax of the 
anhypostasia-enhypostasia couplet is normative (in an analogical rather 
than isomorphic way) over our understanding of the interlocking structure 
of dependence and independence within creation’s contingence. Creation 
is ‘anhypostatic’ (to create an adjective) in that it is dependent on the act 
of God to have existence. Creation does not have its existence out of itself 
but is brought into being by the will and act of God. Creation is 
‘enhypostatic’ in two ways. First, creation is uncompromised in its created 
nature despite being wholly dependent on the act of God. Second, 
creation’s ‘independence’ (meaning its distinct and uncompromised 
reality) has its life within the gracious act and will of God for it out of 
which it was created and by which it is sustained. The anhypostatic and 
enhypostatic aspects of creation are in complementarity in that the 
enhypostatic independence of creation as creation in the will and act of 
God is a necessary consequence of its anhypostatic dependence.  
The correlation of the formal structure of Christology and the 
contingent freedom of creation allows the theologian to assert the discrete 
reality of creation within its dependence upon the will of God for it. Not 
least, this encourages a covenantal view of creation which is made by 
God’s will-to-communion and in which it is responsible to respond in 
faith, obedience and love. Much more pressing for the current study is that 
we are able to affirm the integrity of creation as creation alongside its 
contingence. One objection to this may be that enhypostasia is a poor 
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archetype for the discrete existence of creation because it bears the 
implication that a created being only has subsistence within the divine. It 
is for this reason that I have spoken of an analogical structural 
correspondence rather than a direct isomorphism and suggested that 
creation has its enhypostatic existence within the will of God, unlike the 
human nature of Jesus which has its existence in the person of God the 
Son. 
 
Creation and the philosophy of science 
 
A theological account of the natural world shaped by the triunity of God 
and the primacy of Jesus Christ in how we conceive of the relation of God 
and creation needs to be mediated through philosophy in order to inform 
the process of scientific discovery. The three areas of this translation fall 
within the fundamental nature of reason, the character and purpose of 
theories, and the relationship between human discursivity and the ontic 
order within the natural world itself.  
God stands in a real relation to creation, and this is the relationship that 
constitutes the real existence of creation. Creation is real aside from the 
apprehension of the human knower but not aside from the grace of God. 
Similarly, creation is made to be a certain way and it might have been 
another way. The way creation is, is a product of the will of God and not 
the construction of the human knower. God endowed upon creation a way 
of being, an internal order and coherence. It is this contingent intelligibility 
that makes creation amenable to our understanding (so, Barth: ‘The ratio 
is the rationality of the object in so far as it makes it intelligible to a being 
who can understand’).23 This internal (and contingent) intelligibility 
exercises determinative influence over the way things appear to us. As 
such, the way reality appears to us in phenomena is shaped by the internal 
depths of the coherent order of creation. Truth, in this sense, is primarily 
ontological and it encompasses both reality as it is in its own inner 
structures of coherence and reality as it discloses itself to us as it affects 
our sensibility through phenomena. Such a twofold understanding of truth 
as reality in se and reality pro nobis has been well articulated by T. F. 
Torrance: ‘The truth is that which is what it is and that which discloses 
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what it is as it is. The concept of truth enshrines at once the reality of things 
and the revelation of things as they are in reality.’24 
We can talk in terms here of reality as an emergent system or, in 
Polanyian terms, of a stratified account of reality in which the intelligible 
stratum exercises marginal control over the sensible stratum. Such a 
unitive ontology provides a foundation upon which we may think in a way 
that the empirical and theoretical elements of our knowing form a 
synthesis. Crucially, this synthesis is not brought about through self-
consciousness, but through the force of reality itself as it discloses itself to 
us through phenomena. We may find the philosophical tradition of 
transcendental realism a suitable lexicon for translating this view of the 
natural world.25 Roy Bhaskar advocates a logic of scientific discovery in 
which the real but non-empirical generative mechanisms which give rise 
to and shape the phenomena are the ultimate objects of scientific 
knowledge.26 This has significance for how the theologian might 
encourage the natural scientist to think about what reason is and what it is 
for. Obviously extreme idealism is impossible in an epistemology shaped 
by theological conviction, for the natural world is not real in relation to the 
human mind, but it is real in relation to the creative and redemptive (read 
‘covenantal’) will of God. However, the more subtle anthropocentrism of 
transcendental idealism and classical empiricism (along with its twentieth-
century correlates in rationalism and logical positivism) must be 
abandoned as well. Scientific knowledge is not the notation of our 
response to the stimulus of the iterative disturbance of our sensibility. Nor 
are scientific theories instrumental accounts of the way things behave with 
no ontological referent within reality. We do not have to do with mere 
ideality concerning the order of reality beyond the knower which remains, 
ultimately, unknowable. Objectivity is not merely the eradication of 
difference at the level of intersubjectivity. Reason is the conformity of the 
mind to the truth which is independent from it. 
A theological account of the natural world is also of significance with 
respect to the nature and character of theories. Our theories may be the 
means that we cognize reality, but cognition is characterized by exposing 
the inner coherence nascent in reality rather than imposing a cognizable 
form upon it. In other words, our theories do have an ontic correlate. True 
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knowledge is to know reality in its inherent connections and order. The 
rational structure of our conceptual systems is, therefore, not the creation 
of the human mind but is the integration of the rationality of reality into 
our conceptual systems. It is not only the truth of our words that is in 
reference to the reality that they designate, complex conceptual systems 
which include propositions in reference to other statements also only have 
truth in reference to the complex ontic structure that has shaped them. 
Conceptions of truth as exclusively syntactic coherence (e.g., axiomatic 
systems of valid inference) can have no place within a Christian theology 
of nature. Here we find ourselves back at the person of Jesus Christ. 
Chalcedonian Christology does not allow for any disjunction between 
existence and idea. Truth has given itself to be known in concrete, 
historical form. The Christian can only think of knowing the truth in 
concrete, living fashion. We cannot separate existence and idea any more 
than we can separate the human and divine natures of Jesus Christ. 
Discursive and intuitive reason belong together in a Christian universe. 
The rationalistic concern with ideas devoid of experience in which reason 
operates in accordance with its own laws must be invalidated.27  
If we were to expand the implications of this, scientific theories would 
possess a decidedly unitive character.28 Theories would operate via the co-
operation of semantic and syntactic forms of truth. At the semantic level, 
our propositions describe what is experienced. At the syntactic level, we 
articulate the relationships such as there are between the statements we 
make in response to experience (we can call these empirical statements). 
By merit of the fact that phenomena are governed by an intrinsic 
intelligibility of reality, a cluster of empirical statements will be 
characterized by an implicit coherence. Discursive analysis concerns that 
implicit coherence. Crucially, discursive analysis does not take its leave 
from a priori axioms but from our empirical statements themselves. The 
task of discursive analysis is to draw valid inferences between empirical 
statements and so make explicit the relationship between a cluster of 
empirical statements. In so doing, it will begin to expose the implicit 
coherence of these statements that describe reality and so also the deep 
ontic order of the reality that shaped phenomena in the first place. As such, 
discursive reasoning has the capacity to enhance the disclosure of the 
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actual ontic order of reality and equip us to describe the depths of 
coherence in reality itself. However, it is the actual relations and 
mechanisms (we might call this the ontic logic) within reality itself that 
shapes the logical structure of conceptual system (we might call this ideal 
logic). If, then, there is a role for purely discursive forms of logical analysis 
it is in the strict confines of the artificial separation of a conceptual system 
as ideality so to test its logical coherence as an epistemic structure. Such 
is the synthesis of transcendental realism.  
The contingence of creation is also very important for the relationship 
between discursive reason and the ontic logic of reality. The natural 
universe is not a closed system. It does not have its rationale or order 
within itself but is open beyond itself to its source, which is the creative 
wisdom of God. Creation is, therefore, not constituted by necessity. 
Instead, creation, as contingent upon the will of God for it, is characterised 
by an open indeterminacy. This has a very important implication: the 
conceptual structures, through which we articulate the contingent 
intelligibility of creation, cannot be characterised by a greater necessity 
than the reality they describe. The natural sciences must be an intuitive 
discipline if they are to relate properly to the object they are trying to know, 
meaning that they must be open to a coherent reality beyond themselves 
knowing that the rational order into which they inquire is not ultimately 
self-sustaining or self-sourced. Obviously, this means any a priori logical 
system improper for scientific thought. Discursive analysis drawing 
inferences from axioms in a pure logical necessity is not a way to know 
something that is contingent.  
There is a sharper implication to draw from this. Experiential data must 
not be understood in accordance with a pre-existing inertial frame of 
understanding. The logic by which we interpret experience cannot arise 
from any other source than reality itself. Intuition, the pre-logical insights 
we have into the coherent order within creation through phenomena, is 
very important here. It is only by this pre-conceptual apprehension of 
reality that the levels of discursive reason can truly be contingent upon the 
actual logic within reality. It is precisely this intuitive insight into reality 
prior to cognitive formation that is so fragile and vital to our thinking in 
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accordance with what’s there, if it truly is to be knowledge and not the 
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